Karl Barth leaves room by his own principles for further, even different thinking about Jews and gender than he records in the Dogmatics. Now that Marquardt, Klappert, Sonderegger, Soulen, and others have offered sympathetic critiques from a generally Barthian point of view, and Eberhard Busch has exhaustively laid to rest any biographical questions of Barth’s relation to the Jewish people in his 1996 book, Unter dem Bogen des einen Bundes: Karl Barth und die Juden 1933–1945, the way lies open to (...) carry forward Barth’s theological critique of nineteenth century theology and of abstraction further into the areas of Jews and gender, and to propose constructive pneumatological and exegetical supplements to his thinking. Barth’s thinking on women and men, like his thinking on Jews, labors, for all its promise in its time, under a defect he calls abstraction. Barth faulted Calvin for abstracting both elect human beings and the electing God from Jesus Christ, whom Barth called the elect human being and the electing God in one. Yet on the election of the community Barth did not entirely escape the abstraction. In the manner of Augustine’s Retractions, Barth wrote to Maruardt toward the end of his life that he had been so busy with Israel that he had had no time for the Jews. Does Barth, as Marquardt and Sonderegger suggest, throw up despite himself a conceptual screen onto which he at once projects an abstraction and behind which he hides actual human beings , a screen resistant to the blowing of the Spirit? Do the concepts “ man” and “ woman” form a similar conceptual screen, dating from Schleiermacher’s dialogue Christmas Eve, in which men and women have essentially different responses to the incarnation of Jesus Christ? Das ewig M??nnliche and das ewig Weibliche, inherited from German romanticism, see to run afoul of Barth’s trinitarian particularism, as does “ Israel”. Yet further application of Barth’s own principles, including more attention to the Spirit, leaves him more options in his treatment of Jews and gender, and richer exegesis – including exegesis by anagogy. (shrink)

There is general acknowledgement that both the anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal cortex are implicated in reinforcement-guided decision making, and emotion and social behaviour. Despite the interest that these areas generate in both the cognitive neuroscience laboratory and the psychiatric clinic, ideas about the distinctive contributions made by each have only recently begun to emerge. This reflects an increasing understanding of the component processes that underlie reinforcement- guided decision making, such as the representation of reinforcement expectations, the exploration, updating and representation (...) of action values, and the appreciation that choices are guided not just by the prospect of reward but also by the costs that action entails. Evidence is emerging to suggest that the anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal cortex make distinct contributions to each of these aspects of decision making. (shrink)

Dominick T. Armentano 's book, Antitrust and Monopoly: Anatomy of a Policy Failure, 2nd ed., has serious limitations as a scholarly work. Monopolistic price?raising is even more objectionable under plausible interpretations of Armentano 's subjectivist criterion than in the standard case, which assumes equal subjective value for all consumers? dollar expenditures. Armentano 's historical review of leading antitrust cases is also faulty. His evidence on the alleged failure of price?fixing schemes is defective, and his approach to judging whether monopoly power (...) existed proceeds from an inappropriately static theory. (shrink)

Emotion evaluations are assumed to play a crucial role in the emotion regulation process. We tested a postulate from our framework of emotion dysregulation (Nowak, U., Wittkamp, M. F., Clamor, A., & Lincoln, T. M. [2021]. Using the Ball-in-Bowl metaphor to outline an integrative framework for understanding dysregulated emotion. Frontiers in Psychiatry, 12, 118), namely that the extent to which individuals evaluate an emotion as harmful and their personal resources to modify and accept/tolerate the emotion as sufficient predict the subsequent (...) use of regulation strategies. Participants (n = 118) from a community sample took part in an experience-sampling assessment over 7 days including 10 daily paired measurements. The first measured momentary affective valence and arousal along with harmfulness evaluations and evaluations of personal resources to modify and accept/tolerate an emotion. The second followed three minutes later and measured emotion regulation strategies. The more harmful individuals evaluated an emotion, the more likely they were to use an emotion regulation strategy. The more harmful individuals evaluated an emotion, and the less sufficient they evaluated their personal resources to accept/tolerate an emotion, the more likely they were to use a maladaptive emotion regulation strategy. We conclude that emotions that people evaluate as harmful or difficult to accept are most likely to be regulated in a maladaptive manner. This implies that modifying beliefs about emotions could represent a promising treatment approach. (shrink)

Why is death bad for us, even on the assumption that it involves the absence of experience? Is it worse for us than prenatal nonexistence? In this first volume of the two-volume Morality, Mortality, Kamm begins by considering these questions, critically examining some answers other philosophers have given. The book examines specifically what differences between persons are relevant to the distribution of any scarce resource, discussing for example, the distribution of bodily organs for transplantation.

In this paper, I explore a seldom-recognized connection between the ontology of abstract objects and a current issue in the philosophy of chemistry. Specifically, I argue that realism with regard to universals implies a view of chemical elements similar to F.A. Paneth’s thesis about the dual nature of the concept of element.

Theaetetus, asked what knowledge is, replies that geometry and the other mathematical disciplines are knowledge, and so are crafts like cobbling. Socrates points out that it does not help him to be told how many kinds of knowledge there are when his problem is to know what knowledge itself is, what it means to call geometry or a craft knowledge in the first place—he insists on the generality of his question in the way he often does when his interlocutor, asked (...) for a definition, cites instead cases of the concept to be defined. (shrink)

Translation at this stage would be premature, but three variants in line 3 deserve notice, Bury writes Natorp , followed by Brochard , suggested , Wachsmuth prints a colon instead of a comma after It is not surprising that line 3 has attracted emendation. As it stands, it lacks a verb and has to modify an understood existential.